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OF DINOSAURS AND INDEFINITE LAND 
TRUSTS: A REVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL 
AMERICAN INDIAN PROPERTY RIGlITS 
AMIDST THE LEGACY OF ALLOTMENT 
MARK D. POINDEXTER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The time-honored adage that a person's greatest investment is his 
or her house fails to acknowledge adequately what every first-year 
property law student will learn: the house is but a glorified "fixture" of 
the real property-the land. l Houses rise and fall with the vicissitudes 
of human whim, and the relentless, often unpredictable course of 
nature. The land, however, largely remains steadfast; it is, in a sense, 
eternal. 
Although most people recognize the potential economic value of 
land, few understand or appreciate this "spiritual" dimension. The 
American Indian, however, not only has understood this special value 
of land, but indeed has incorporated it as part of his or her cultural 
existence.2 Nowhere will one find greater respect for the land and what 
it can teach than in American Indian culture.3 
Arguably, it is precisely this special relationship between the Amer-
ican Indians and their lands which prompted the United States gov-
* Solicitations Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. 
I See A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 706 (3d ed. 
1984). 
2 See generally SAM GILL, MOTHER EARTH (1987). Although varied in form and interpretation, 
the concept of "Mother Earth" -the female personification of the nurturing and healing qualities 
of the land-has received almost universal acceptance among the major American Indian tribes. 
See id. at 6. This concept, however, cannot be fully comprehended merely by observing its 
meaning within a vacuum of American Indian culture: "Mother Earth, as she existed in North 
America, cannot be adequately understood and appreciated apart from the complex history of 
the encounter between Native Americans and Americans of European ancestry." [d. Accordingly, 
the increasingly overt emergence of Mother Earth in American Indian culture was probably as 
much an internal phenomenon relating to shared cultural teaching and beliefs, as it was a kind 
of collective response to oftentimes threatening external provocations regarding the use (and 
abuse) of heretofore American Indian lands. See id. at 40; see also DUANE CHAMPAGNE, CULTURAL 
SURVIVAL REpORT 32: AMERICAN INDIAN SOCIETIES-STRATEGIES AND CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL 
AND CULTURAL SURVIVAL 5-14 (1989). 
3 See generally GILL, supra note 2. 
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ernment's allotment policies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.4 Legislators, whose motives were idealistic at best, decided 
that the then-prevailing policy of segregating lands for aggregate tribal 
use should give way to a policy of allotting those lands to individual 
tribe members.5 The much heralded purpose behind this policy 
change was to create more assimilation of the individual American 
Indian into the "dominant" culture: a goal considered by both numer-
ous legislators and American Indian rights advocates as being in the 
best interest of the American Indian.6 Running a close second to this 
primarily ''benevolent'' aim, however, were the twin goals of directly 
and completely undermining tribal sovereignty, and the large-scale 
opening of portions of former reservation lands to white settlement.7 
By most accounts, the federal government's initial individual al-
lotment policy of the 1870s created far more problems for the Ameri-
can Indian than it solved.8 For example, because most allotted lands 
could be alienated as soon as they were granted, many American 
Indians were stripped of their individual parcels through imprudent 
and often fraudulent transactions with unscrupulous parties.9 In an 
attempt to rectify many of these problems, Congress imposed various 
prohibitions on the alienation of allotted lands during the 1880s and 
1890s. Although the federal government's allotment policy was later 
abandoned in the 1930s, many of those previously introduced prohi-
bitions on the alienation or encumbrance of American Indian land 
remain to this day. 10 
This Note examines the modern effects of the allotment process 
on the individual American Indian's ability to execute agreements 
4 See generally D.S. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE AlLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (Francis 
Paul Prucha ed. 1973). 
5 See BRIAN DIPPlE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN: WHITE ATTITUDES AND U.S. INDIAN POLICY 
139...{iO (1982). 
6 See id. 
7 See Sharon O'Brien, Federal Indian Policies and the International Protection of Human Rights, 
in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY 35, 43 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed. 1985). 
8 See generally OTIS, supra note 4, at 8-32. 
9 See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. Subsequent legislation in this area imposed 
a trust period of 25 years during which the new allottees would not be able to sell or make 
contracts touching their lands. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text; see also County of 
Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 686 (1992) (discussing trust periods for allotted 
lands). 
10 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1988). Through these provisions, Congress extended indefinitely 
the existing periods of trust applicable to lands already allotted but not yet released in fee. 
However, at his or her discretion, the Secretary of the Interior may remove such restrictions 
against alienation upon application of the American Indian owners. See 25 U.S.C. § 483 (1988); 
25 C.F.R. §§ 152.1-152.14 (1992) ("Issuance of patents in fee, certificates of competency, removal 
of restrictions, and sale of certain Indian lands"). 
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which concern his or her land. Although the federal government 
discarded the allotment policy more than half a century ago, the 
policy's effects continue to curtail many of the commercial freedoms 
of certain modern American Indian landholders. This result is largely 
inconsistent with the more recently stated governmental goals of lim-
ited intervention and the promotion of American Indian self-determi-
nation. 11 
Part II of this Note reviews a recent property rights case involving 
the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe in South Dakota, and examines how 
the effects of allotment and trust periods continue to encumber alien-
ability of individual American Indian lands. Part III reviews some of 
the more relevant history and legislation affecting individual American 
Indian property rights. I2 Finally, Part IV reconvenes the discussion of 
American Indian property rights based on the case study presented in 
Part II and the historical and legislative discussion presented in Part 
III. In addition, Part IV critically assesses the extent to which continued 
encumbrances of certain American Indian lands are consistent with 
the federal government's post-allotment policy goals of promoting 
American Indian self-determination and limited government interven-
tion. 
II. THE STORY OF "SUE" 
In August 1990, researcher Sue Henderickson of the Black Hills 
Institute of Geological Research in South Dakota noticed something 
odd protruding from a cliff face near the area in which she was 
participating in a fossil excavation. I3 From a cursory inspection, large, 
reptilian-like fossils appeared encrusted in the cliff. Further examina-
tion proved necessary, however, to be certain of the identity of the 
fossils. 
In order to secure excavation rights, Peter L. Larson, president of 
the Black Hills Institute, paid the landowner, Maurice A. Williams, 
11 See infra note 126. 
12 This Note will not examine legislation directly addressed to tribal-as opposed to individ-
ual-land rights. For an extensive review of such legislation, see generally AMERICAN INDIAN 
POLICY IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed. 1985) [hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN 
POLICY]; FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw (1986); MONROE E. PRICE, LAw 
AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN: READINGS, NOTES AND CASES (1973). For an insightful, historical 
review of American Indian policy and tribal land rights, see generally Philip P. Frickey, Congres-
sional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 
1137 (1990). 
13Malcolm W. Browne, A Dinosaur Named Sue Divides Fossil Hunters, N.Y. TIMES,July 21, 
1992, at Cl. 
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$5000.14 Mr. Williams is a Cheyenne Sioux rancher, and the landl5 on 
which the fossil was discovered was actually held in trust by the United 
States "for the sole benefit of Williams."16 
What paleontologists initially thought to be a few interesting relics 
turned out to be a sixty-five million-year-old skeleton of a Tyranno-
saurus rex. Nicknamed "Sue" for its discoverer, paleontologists regard 
this fossil as "the best-preserved and most complete tyrannosaur fossil 
ever found."17 In short, the Black Hills Institute, for an initial expen-
diture of $5000, obtained a virtually priceless find. ls 
Leaders of the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe were outraged by the 
excavation agreement between Mr. Williams and the Black Hills Insti-
tute. They contacted Acting U.S. Attorney Kevin Schieffer for the 
District of South Dakota in an attempt to nullify the excavation agree-
ment and to have Sue returned to the reservation.19 The Sioux leaders 
argued that because Mr. Williams's land was still being held in trust by 
the federal government,20 any unauthorized contract touching this 
land (such as an excavation agreement) violated federallaw. 21 
14 See id. 
15 The land is within the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian reservation. Id. 
16 See Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. United States Dep't of Justice, 967 F.2d 1237, 
1239 (8th Cir. 1992). The instrument creating the trust status was a trust·patent deed from the 
federal government dated September 23, 1969. See Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. 
United States Dep't of Justice, 812 F. Supp. 1015, 1016-17 (D.S.D. 1993). The trust status for Mr. 
Williams's land will expire on September 23, 1994. Id. at 1020. But see infra notes 132-46 and 
accompanying text (discussing possible complications in Williams's scheduled grant of a fee-pat-
ent in 1994). 
17Browne, supra note 13, at Cl. 
18This windfall may be tempered somewhat by the fact that Mr. Larson notified academic 
paleontologists of the find and invited them to participate in a broad study of the fossil. See id. 
In addition, Mr. Larson announced that his institute eventually would donate the fossil to a 
nonprofit museum to be built in Hill City, South Dakota. Id. 
19 See Black Hills Inst., 967 F.2d at 1238. 
20 Historically, upon completion of a trust period, the federal government would release to 
the American Indian beneficiary an unrestricted "fee-patent" to his or her land. This unrestricted 
fee-patent meant that the land was now owned outright (both legally and equitably) by the former 
beneficiary. In turn, the former beneficiary was free to do what he or she wished with the land. 
While these lands remained in trust, however, it was the trustee-in this case the federal govern-
ment-which held ultimate discretion over the use of the beneficiary's land. See generally CASNER 
& LEACH, supra note 1 at 90; OTIS, supra note 4; see also Black Hills Inst., 812 F. Supp. at 1022. 
21 See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1988) (any conveyance of restricted lands held in trust by the 
United States, without the express permission of the Secretary of the Interior, is absolutely null 
and void); see also Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 438 (1912) (finding an unauthorized 
conveyance of restricted lands violates not only the proprietary rights of the American Indian, 
but the governmental rights of the United States); Bailey v. Banister, 200 F.2d 683, 685 (10th Cir. 
1952) (holding where an American Indian holds legal title to lands with a restriction against 
alienation, the title may be transferred only under rules and regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary of the Interior, and with his or her consent and approval); United States v. Gilbertson, 
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On May 14, 1992, Schieffer led a task force of approximately 
thirty-five FBI agents and twenty National Guardsmen to Hill City, 
South Dakota for a raid on the Black Hills Institute. 22 The federal 
officers seized the tyrannosaur fossil (approximately ten tons of bones) 
as evidence in the preparation of possible criminal charges against the 
Black Hills Institute. 23 The bones are being stored in a machine shop 
at the South Dakota School of Mines and Technology pending the final 
resolution of this controversy.24 
III F.2d 978, 980 (7th Cir. 1940) (concluding purchases in good faith, for valuable consideration 
and without knowledge of restrictions on conveyance of trust land, are not defenses in an action 
by the government to avoid the conveyance as a violation of restrictions against alienation); 
Haymond v. Scheer, 543 P.2d 541, 545 (Okla. 1975) ("A conveyance of ... restricted [American] 
Indian lands made in violation of a federal statute authorizing the alienation of such lands is 
against public policy and absolutely void, and in no manner can any right, title or interest in such 
land be acquired under such a conveyance.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
22 Browne, supra note 13, at C1. 
23 The seizure was based, inter alia, on an alleged violation of the Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 433 (1988). Under the Antiquities Act, the removal of any object of antiquity from federal lands 
is punishable by a $500 fine and/or 90 days in prison. Id. 
24In May of 1992, the first phase of litigation regarding Sue developed. The Black Hills 
Institute sought a preliminary injunction requiring the federal government to return the fossil 
to it for safekeeping until the question of ownership was settled. See Black Hills Inst. v. United 
States Dep't of Justice, 967 F.2d 1237, 1238 (8th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The Institute 
argued that the fossil was being irreparably damaged because of the government's lack of 
expertise in handling a find of this magnitude. Id. The district court, Judge Richard H. Battey 
presiding, denied the Institute's motion without addressing the damage claim. Id. The district 
court viewed the matter as merely an attempt by the Institute to regain evidence lawfully seized 
in a criminal investigation. Id. 
The Institute appealed the matter to a panel of judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit. Id. at 1237. The circuit court upheld the district court's finding that the govern-
ment had the right to retain seized goods for a reasonable time while a criminal investigation 
was in process. Id. at 1240. The circuit court found, however, that the lower court did not properly 
take into account the damage to the fossil allegedly occurring while in the government's posses-
sion.Id. at 1241. The circuit court remanded the case to the district court with directions to "hold 
a hearing at [the district court's] earliest possible convenience to determine proper custodianship 
of the fossil during the pendency of this case." Id. 
On remand, the district court named the South Dakota School of Mines and Technology as 
the custodian of the fossil pendente lite. See Black Hills Inst. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 978 
F.2d 1043, 1044 (8th Cir. 1992). The court determined that moving the fossil back to the Black 
Hills Institute would do more damage than merely leaving it where it was. Id. On appeal of this 
decision, the Eighth Circuit upheld the lower court's decision, remanding the case for further 
proceedings on the merits with the hope that the "litigious legal maneuvering that has resulted 
in several interlocutory matters that we have considered will not recur." Id. at 1045. 
On February 3, 1993, the district court, Judge Battey presiding, ruled that Sue had been 
excavated illegally from federal land being held in trust, and that the excavated bones therefore 
belong to the federal government. See Black Hills Inst. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 812 F. 
Supp. 1015, 1022 (D.S.D. 1993); see also Malcolm W. Browne, Dinosaur Fossil Belongs Not Just to 
the Ages but to the Government, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1993, at A12. For a more complete discussion 
of this ruling, see infra part IV, sec. A. 
58 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:53 
III. .AN HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE ALLOTMENT POLICY 
The district court's ruling that Sue was illegally excavated invokes 
the legacy of well over a century of federal policy regarding individual 
American Indian property rights. Because many volumes of scholar-
ship would only scratch the surface of such a rich history, this section 
provides an overview of some of its more influential moments.25 
A. Origins of the Allotment Theory: The Call for 
American Indian Assimilation 
Although historians have dated the introduction of the concept 
of individual allotments of American Indian lands as early as 1798,26 
the federal government's policy of general allotment gradually took 
form during the 1870s.27 Many legislators and American Indian rights 
advocates at the time felt that the prevailing policy of segregating land 
for the exclusive use and control of the American Indian tribes simply 
was not furthering the "best interests" of the individual American 
Indian.28 The tribe, once considered a source of cultural strength and 
sustenance, increasingly was viewed as a bar to the progress of Ameri-
can Indian civilization.29 An agent for the Yankton Sioux tribe wrote 
in 1877: "As long as Indians live in villages they will retain many of 
their old and i~urious habits. Frequent feasts, community in food, 
heathen ceremonies, constant visiting-these will continue as long as 
the people live together in close neighborhoods .... "30 Proponents of 
assimilation believed that only by lessening the influence of the tribe 
on the individual American Indian would he or she be able to become 
a part of the larger culture, and reap the benefits of a "civilized" 
lifestyle.31 
25 For a more extensive review of this history, see generally OTIS, supra note 4; COHEN, supra 
note 12; PRICE, supra note 12; AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, supra note 12. 
26 See COHEN, supra note 12, at 206. 
27 See OTIS, supra note 4, at 3. 
28 See PRICE, supra note 12, at 531-44. 
29 See OTIS, supra note 4, at 9. 
30Id. (citation omitted). 
31 Congressman Bishop W. Perkins of Kansas commented in 1886: 
In the judgment of the great mass of the American people the time has come when 
the policy of keeping the Indians together in their tribal organizations and restrain-
ing and controlling them by bayonets and shotguns must be abandoned and a new 
era inaugurated-an era of the allotment of lands to the Indians in severalty, an 
era of education, an era in which they shall be enabled and required to qualifY 
themselves for the duties of American citizenship, and to support themselves by 
industry and toil. 
DIPPlE, supra note 5, at 139-40 (citation omitted). 
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1. The Land as the Key to American Indian Assimilation: 
A Theory of Commonality 
Arguably, the critical question for lawmakers was how American 
Indian assimilation should be accomplished most efficiently. There is 
little direct evidence indicating which competing legislative means 
Congress considered for achieving this assimilation. Indirect evidence, 
however, indicates that Congress probably utilized a type of sociological 
model. The simple premise of this model is that which a group holds in 
common often serves to strengthen and unify the group. 32 
The tribe, like any other narrowly defined group or cohort, shared 
certain common characteristics. Most obviously, the members of a 
particular tribe shared a common racial and ethnic heritage. In addi-
tion, members of a tribe often shared a common cultural bond of 
spiritual and secular beliefs, which served to sustain and define the 
tribe in the midst of sometimes radical outside challenges to its estab-
lished ways. 33 
There was something else, however, that the tribe held in com-
mon: the land upon which it was "permitted" to live as a result of the 
federal government's reservation policies. Arguably, more than any 
racial or cultural definition, the most overt example of that which 
defined the tribe was its common land. To the uninformed outside 
observer, the boundaries of the land reserved for the tribe defined it 
in much the same way that the borders of a country define a nation. 
In addition, the land was the one common feature of the tribe which 
was historically least likely to be controlled by the tribe itself. 34 
In turn, when lawmakers decided that tribal influences should be 
lessened to promote American Indian assimilation, the most efficient 
means to achieve this end no doubt became rather evident: it would 
32 That this premise probably served as the basis of this new American Indian land policy 
was revealed by President Theodore Roosevelt's comments heralding the allotment policy as a 
"mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass .... " O'Brien, supra note 7, at 43 (citation 
omitted). Another historian observed that "[w]hen land is held in common the possibility of 
dissolving the group is difficult" PRICE, supra note 12, at 541. 
33 See GILL, supra note 2, at 8-11. 
34The federal government's domination over American Indian lands can be traced back at 
least to the 1790s. For example, one historian notes: 
A major victory over the northwestern tribes at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 
had redressed the earlier [governmental] setbacks in establishing control over the 
region and had resulted in a substantial cession of Indian land north and west of 
the Ohio River .... To the south, meanwhile, the Cherokees, Chickasaws, and 
Creeks, under unremitting governmental pressure, reluctantly ceded lands in Geor-
gia and Tennessee. 
DIPPlE, supra note 5, at 5; see also CHAMPAGNE, supra note 2, at 6. 
60 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:53 
be impossible to change the tribe's commonly shared racial and ethnic 
characteristics; it would not be feasible to attempt to alter directly the 
commonly shared cultural bonds within the tribe. The land, however, 
was a wholly different matter. Tribal lands, unlike race or cultural 
beliefs, could readily be manipulated to promote the assimilationists' 
policies.35 Lands, previously parceled out to the tribe, would now be 
allotted to individual American Indians so as to "further minimize the 
functions of tribal leaders and tribal institutions and to continually 
strengthen the position of the government representative and his 
subordinates, and to improve the effectiveness of their programs to 
break down traditional patterns within the Indian communities."36 
In summary, through the federal government's usurpation of the 
traditional power of the tribe over American Indian lands and its policy 
of creating individual allotments of those lands, lawmakers believed 
the American Indian would be better prepared for assimilation.37 Ac-
cording to the theory, if he or she could be made independent of the 
tribe and could be taught the lessons of industry38 and private owner-
ship from the dominant culture, the American Indian surely would 
become "civilized." 
2. Other Motivations Behind the Movement for American Indian 
Assimilation: Their Supporters and Critics 
Certainly there were other, less "philanthropic" motives behind 
this new allotment policy. Stripping away tribal influence over the 
disposition of American Indian lands actually made those lands more 
35 As one historian observed: "Land [held by the American Indian] was always to be used 
[by the federal government] for a specific educational purpose. Land held in common teaches 
certain sorts of conduct and attitudes, while land held in individual allotments teaches other 
ways." PRICE, supra note 12, at 541. 
36 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, supra note 12. 
37 In debating the need for federal legislation addressing Indian allotment, a member of 
Congress remarked in 1886: 
What shall be [the American Indian's] future status? Shall he remain a pauper 
savage, blocking the pathway of civilization, an increasing burden upon the people? 
Or shall he be converted into a civilized taxpayer, contributing toward the support 
of the Government and adding to the material prosperity of the country? ... We 
desire, I say, that the latter shall be his destiny. 
OTIS, supra note 4, at 17 (citation omitted). 
38The term "industry" as used here refers only to a kind of affection for hard work as 
described by the sociologist Max Weber. See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND 
THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons, trans. 1985). According to the assimilationist theory, 
the American Indian was best suited for an agrarian vocation. See generally OTIS, supra note 4. 
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freely alienable.39 Governmental and business concerns could now deal 
directly with the individual American Indian regarding his or her land, 
thereby possibly avoiding the often complicated and potentially humili-
ating discussions associated with tribal negotiations.40 Proponents of 
the new allotment policy argued that such a development might also 
ease the long-standing tensions between American Indians and white 
settlers regarding the use of triballands.4l Thus, the policy of individual 
allotments seemed to be the perfect compromise between both phil-
anthropic and pragmatic goals.42 
Critics, however, viewed this newly emerging allotment policy with 
great skepticism. Many American Indian rights advocates pointed out 
39 See County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 686 (1992). In analyzing 
this phenomenon, ene historian noted: 
The reservation ... locked into tribal ownership, could be viewed as a resource 
withdrawn from the main direction of economic development in the United States. 
Vast stretches, held in trust and in common, would not be available for non-Indian 
ownership; and under then-existing rules, investment and development by non-In-
dians was difficult. All this the allotment legislation changed. 
PRICE, supra note 12, at 541-42. 
40The meeting between General William H. Harrison and the Shawnee leader, Tecumseh, 
in 1809 at Vincennes provides a good example of such a potentially humiliating encounter. See 
GILL, supra note 2, at 8-11. The United States government's purpose in holding this meeting 
was to fashion an agreement in which the Iroquois tribes would forfeit to the government some 
three million acres (thus opening them to settlement), in exchange for specified goods and 
annuities in the amount of$10,000. See id. In the face ofthis great governmental power, Tecumseh 
was reported to respond: 
The Great Spirit said he gave this great island to his red children. He placed the 
whites on the other side of the big water. They were not contented with their own, 
but came to take ours from us. They .have driven us from the sea to the lakes. We 
can go no farther. They have taken upon themselves to say this tract belongs to the 
Miami, this to the Delawares, and so on. But the Great Spirit intended it as the 
common property of all the tribes, nor can it be sold without the consent of all. 
Our father [the government] tells us we have no business on the Wabash; the land 
belongs to other tribes. But the Great Spirit ordered us to come here and we shall 
stay. 
Id. at 10. Although there was little chance that the tribes would be able to retain their lands-
whether they agreed to the proposal or not-Tecumseh emerged from this meeting a much 
heralded figure, while General Harrison was greatly reduced in stature, resorting to categorizing 
Tecumseh's words as "sufficiently insolent" and "arrogant." See id. at 11. 
41 Secretary of the Interior Carl Shurz commented in 1880: 
[Allotment] will eventually open to settlement by white men the large tracts ofland 
now belonging to the reservations, but not used by the Indians. It will thus put the 
relations between the Indians and their white neighbors in the western country 
upon a new basis, by gradually doing away with the system of large reservations, 
which has so frequently provoked those encroachments which in the past have led 
to so much cruel injustice and so many disastrous collisions. 
OTIS, supra note 4, at 17 (citation omitted). 
42Id. at 20-21. 
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that the later stages of the allotment process were forced upon the 
tribes by Congress rather than entered into voluntarily.43 The judiciary 
showed almost complete deference to such legislative action.44 As one 
legal scholar commented: 
The Court aided in this [federal control over tribal lands] 
process, holding that the plenary power of Congress, derived 
from the Indian's "condition of dependency," somehow con-
verted Indian property, even fee simple property, into quasi-
public land 'subject to the administrative control of the gov-
ernment.' This authority permitted Congress, acting through 
the Secretary of the Interior, to lease, sell, or allot any tribal 
land without tribal consent, even in violation of solemn treaty 
promises.45 
Because American Indian land was considered "public" (even land 
held in fee simple), the courts facilitated the unilateral imposition 
of the allotment policy-regardless of the tribe's vested rights or 
contrary wishes. 46 
In addition to this "compulsion factor," some lawmakers argued 
that despite any alleged philanthropic goals of allotment, the real 
motivation behind the policy was simply to wrest from the American 
Indians land which was rightfully theirs.47 Indeed, some critics sug-
gested that the most powerful force motivating the allotment process 
was not concern for American Indian assimilation at all, but for west-
ern settlers who aggressively sought an increasingly expanding land 
base.48 
The influence of such stinging criticisms grew as the allotment 
process itself appeared to frustrate its more substantive policy goals. 
43 See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations, 132 
U. PA. L. REv. 195,219 n.l23 (1984). 
44 See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 307-08 (1902) (ruling congressional 
control over administration of tribal lands is a "political question," the manner of its exercise not 
being within the province of the courts). See generally Newton, supra note 43. 
45 Newton, supra note 43, at 219-20 (citations omitted). 
46 [d. 
47 OTIS, supra note 4, at 20. 
48 A minority report of the House Indian Affairs Committee in 1880 noted: 
The real aim of this [allotment] bill is to get at the indian lands and open them 
up to settlement. The provisions for the apparent benefit of the indian are but 
pretext to get at his lands and occupy them .... If this were done in the name of 
Greed, it would be bad enough; but to do it in the name of Humanity, and under 
the cloak of an ardent desire to promote the indian's welfare ... is infinitely worse. 
Id. at 19 (citation omitted). 
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Because many allotted lands could be sold soon after they were re-
ceived, numerous allottees lost their lands through hasty transactions 
with unscrupulous parties that were often marked by fraud. 49 In many 
cases, the land was out of the allottees' hands as soon as it was granted 
by the government.50 As a result, the allotment process as it existed 
severely compromised the goal of American Indian economic self-
sufficiency.51 
B. The Indian General Allotment Act of 1887 
In an attempt to preserve what was "good" about the allotment 
policy while at the same time safeguarding the American Indian against 
the policy's apparent ravages, Congress passed the Indian General 
Allotment Act ofl887. 52 This Act, more commonly known as the Dawes 
Act (named for its sponsor, Senator Henry Laurens Dawes), solidified 
the government's heretofore splintered allotment policies.53 The chief 
provisions of the Act required: 
49 See County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 686 (1992). Reflecting upon 
the federal government's allotment policy, Rep. Edgar Howard, Chairman of the House Commit-
tee on Indian Mfairs, commented in 1934: 
The conduct of Indian affairs by the Federal Government for the past century has 
been a scandal and a blot on our name in every part of the world. Predatory 
interests have systematically and continually robbed the Indian of his property; the 
Government, by law, has supinely permitted this robbery, cloaking it under a sterile 
and sinister legality that was a travesty of justice and national honor and under a 
Federal "guardianship" that, with incredible complacency, watched through gen-
erations the destruction of the Indian estate and the Indian character. 
73 CONGo REc. 11,727 (1934). 
50 An historian commenting on the pre-Dawes Act allotment policies of the federal govern-
ment somewhat caustically noted: 
Where Indians had the right of selling their lands it was in the nature of things that 
those lands should slip from their grasp. In 1878 the Mackinac agent said that a 
treaty of 1855 had granted lands in severalty to certain adult Chippewas but 
"through the shameful neglect of the agents then and since in charge, they have 
frittered a large portion of them away, and today, I am of the opinion, not one in 
ten who have had these lands owns an acre, and they are as poor as if they had 
never owned them." In his report of that year the Commissioner [of Indian Affairs] 
noted that five-sixths of the 1,735 Chippewas in Michigan who had received patents 
had lost their lands. 
OTIS, supra note 4, at 50 (citations omitted). 
51 County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 686. 
52 24 Stat 388, as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1988) 
(signed into law by President Grover Cleveland on February 8, 1887). 
53 See OriS, supra note 4, at 3-7; see also COHEN, supra note 12, at 207-10. 
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(1) a grant of 160 acres to each family head, of eighty acres 
to each single person over eighteen years of age and to each 
orphan under eighteen, and of forty acres to each other 
single person under eighteen; 
(2) a patent in fee to be issued to every allottee but to be held 
in trust by the Government for twenty-five years, during which 
time the land could not be alienated or encumbered; 
(3) a period of four years to be allowed the indians to which 
they should make their selections after allotment should be 
applied to any tribe-failure of the indians to do so should 
result in selection for them at the order of the Secretary of 
the Interior; 
(4) citizenship to be conferred upon allottees and upon any 
other indians who had abandoned their tribes and adopted 
"the habits of civilized life. "54 
Most significantly, the Dawes Act gave the President virtually un-
fettered discretion in allotting tribal lands nationwide-with or without 
the consent of the American Indian nations involved. 55 In this way, the 
government could avoid the often time-consuming, tribe-by-tribe regu-
lation of lands associated with the pre-Dawes Act era. 56 
Nowhere was this new efficiency more apparent than in the actual 
application of allotment to the reservations. 57 In all the years prior to 
the passage of the Dawes Act, the government approved 7463 allot-
ments with a total acreage of 584,423; from 1887 through 1900, it 
approved a total of 53,168 allotments with an acreage of nearly 
5,000,000.58 
54 OTIS, supra note 4, at 7 (citation omitted). The grant of citizenship to the American Indian 
who took his or her allotment was one of the cornerstones of the assimilation policy. See DIPPlE, 
supra note 5, at 192-96. The Burke Act of 1906, however, dampened this advance under the 
Dawes Act by deferring citizenship until the expiration of the trust period for the allotted lands. 
SeeThe Burke Act of 1906, ch. 2358, 34 Stat 182 (1906). 
5525 U.S.C. § 331 (1988) ("the President shall be authorized to cause ... allotment to each 
Indian located thereon [former Indian lands of tribes or bands] to be made in such areas as in 
his opinion may be for their best interest . ... " ) (emphasis added). See also supra notes 43--46 and 
accompanying text Uudicial recognition of congressional plenary power over the administration 
of American Indian lands). 
56 See Newton, supra note 43, at 220. 
57 See OTIS, supra note 4, at 86. 
58Id. at 87 (citation omitted). 
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Supporters of the Act were anxious to see it work. As one com-
mentator queried, 'What reason would there be for the delay in start-
ing the Indian on the free high road to wealth and civilization?"59 In 
addition, western land seekers and business promoters no doubt were 
elated at the prospect of the soon-to-be opened American Indian lands 
which, until that time, had been wholly reserved for tribal use. 50 
C. Leasing: A Good Solution, But a Worse Problem 
If the number of allotments granted were the only measure, few 
could question the apparent success of the government's new land 
policy.61 Lands, previously closed to western settlers, were quickly open-
ing.62 The new allotment system introduced thousands of American 
Indian allottees to the "civilized" concept of private ownership. Those 
who fought hard for allotment-friend and potential foe of the Ameri-
can Indian alike-could revel in the hopeful genesis of this policy.63 
The number of allotment applications under the Dawes Act, how-
ever, was but one indication of success. As discussed earlier, the federal 
government adopted the allotment policy principally to create a cli-
mate whereby the American Indian could maintain a successful agrar-
ian lifestyle. 54 Allotment was to give the American Indian a stake not 
only in the fruits of the land, but in the fruits of a self-sustaining, 
"civilized" future. 55 
Much of the allottees' land, however, was not at all suitable for 
agrarian purposes.55 Moreover, those American Indians fortunate 
enough to have been allotted arable land often did not have the tools 
or skills necessary to become successful farmers. 67 Along with the allot-
ment system, the government established little to no educational or 
financial support to assist the new landowners.58 As a result, many of 
59Id. at 83. 
60 Although under the Dawes Act a portion of former reservation land was reserved for 
individual allotments, school funds, and certain tribal purposes, a larger percentage of those lands 
became open for settlement. See id. at 87. In turn, the allotment process created the classic 
conundrum whereby the sum of the parts (i.e., individual allotments) was often substantially less 
than the whole (i.e., pre-allotment reservation lands). 
61 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
62 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
63 See OTIS, supra note 4, at 98. 
64 See id. at 4. 
65 See PRICE, supra note 12, at 531-42. 
66 See OTIS, supra note 4, at 100. 
67 See id. at 102, 108-15. 
68The Farm Equipment Appropriations Act of 1888 provided for the allocation of $30,000 
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the new allottees increasingly were becoming even more dependent 
on the government than was the case before allotment.69 The federal 
government quickly learned that the mere allotting of land and the 
promise of citizenship alone would not make the American Indian 
independent. 70 
In response to these early problems in the allotment policy, law-
makers considered new ideas regarding the better utilization of allot-
ted lands. One such idea was the concept of leasing.7I If the introduc-
tion of the allotment policy could serve as a reliable indication, many 
of the new American Indian allottees had no real interest in becoming 
independent farmers. 72 In addition, many of the allotted lands lay idle, 
having been granted to the sick, the aged, or the young. 73 Proponents 
of leasing argued that if these persons were free to lease their hold-
ings-a concept that was forbidden under the Dawes Act as it then 
stood-they would then at least be able to support themselves through 
rents and fees.74 Proponents also argued that the leasing process would 
provide a kind of "agricultural diversity" whereby experienced and 
capable farmers might be able to lease land next to the new American 
Indian allottees and show them "the way" to civilized farming and a 
civilized life. 75 
Assuredly, there were many involved in American Indian affairs 
who vehemently opposed the leasing of newly allotted lands. Certain 
critics viewed the leasing proposal as yet another shameless attempt by 
western settlers and other business concerns to make further inroads 
in acquiring American Indian lands.76 Other opponents, however, 
to the purchase of seed, farming implements, etc. See id. at 101 (citations omitted). In 1888 alone, 
3568 allotments had been made. Id. Hence, on average, the $30,000 appropriation granted 
approximately $8.40 to every new allottee about to begin his or her farming career. Id. 
69 An historian assessed the reasons for this apparent failure of the allotment policy: 
The reason for this whole failure seems to be that in the first place most of the 
friends of the Indian showed a great lack of imagination and of any practical notion 
about what allotment for the Indian involved. They thought the law would work 
the transformation and would by definition make the Indian a farmer. All he then 
needed was Christianizing and culture. Therefore, [once the law was passed, tlhey 
rested from thinking and toiling on behalf of the Indian .... 
OTIS, supra note 4, at 103. 
70 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text 
71 See PRICE, supra note 12, at 551-62; see also COHEN, supra note 12, at 227-29. 
72 See OTIS, supra note 4, at 108-15. 
73 See id. at 108. 
74Id. 
75Id. 
76 See id. at 109. 
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viewed leasing as chiefly detrimental to American Indians themselves. 77 
If the raison d'etre for the allotment policy was to make the American 
Indian self-sufficient through the cultivation of his or her own land, 
then, critics argued, leasing that land to another would completely 
undermine that policy. 
Mter much debate, Congress added a leasing amendment to the 
Dawes Act on February 28, 1891.78 This amendment provided that the 
American Indian could rent his or her land only when unable to work 
it "by reason of age or other disability."79 No doubt, Congress intended 
this restriction as a compromise that would separate those truly "un-
able" personally to farm their lands from those allottees who merely 
were unwilling to do SO.80 In addition, Congress further restricted 
leasing by stipulating that farming and grazing leases of allotted lands 
could last no longer than three years.8! 
A further expansion of the allottees' leasing rights occurred when 
Congress passed the General Indian Appropriations Act of 1894.82 This 
law expanded the limiting "by reason of age or disability" phrase in the 
1891 Act to include the phrase "or inability."83 Although a seemingly 
insignificant change, the addition of the words "or inability" had the 
potential to increase greatly the number of American Indian allottees 
who would be allowed to lease their lands. The Board of Indian Com-
missioners interpreted the new Act to provide that: 
[t]he term "inability" as used in the amended act, cannot be 
specifically defined as the other terms [age or disability] have 
77 Senator Dawes commented at the 1890 Mohonk Conference: 
Such a [leasing] law, in my opinion, would speedily overthrow the whole allotment 
system. The Indian would at once seek to let his land, and relieve himself from 
work; and there would be whites so ready to take possession that all barriers would 
soon be broken down. Thus the allotment law would be gradually undermined and 
destroyed, and the Indian would abandon his own work, his own land, and his own 
home, which we have talked about as the central pivot of our efforts in attempting 
to civilize the Indian. 
OTIS, supra note 4, at 109 (citation omitted). Although Senator Dawes at first had been opposed 
to any kind of leasing, he later modified his views, ostensibly because "he had seen the Indians 
grow discouraged in their attempts to break the prairies' lands." Id. at 115. 
78 See 26 Stat. 794, 794-96 (1891). 
79Id. "'Other Disability' applied to all unmarried Indian women, married women whose 
husbands or sons were unable to work the land, widows without able-bodied sons, all Indians with 
chronic sickness or incurable physical defect, and those with 'native defect of mind or permanent 
incurable mental disease.'" OTIS, supra note 4, at 116-17 (citation omitted). 
80 See OTIS, supra note 4, at 113-14. 
81Id. at 112. 
82 General Indian Appropriations Act of 1894, ch. 290, 28 Stat. 286, 305 (1894). 
83Id. 
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been. Any allottee not embraced in any of the foregoing 
classes who for any reason other than those stated is unable 
to cultivate his lands or a portion of them, and desires to lease 
same, may make application thereof to the proper agent.84 
In addition, farming and grazing leases were extended to five years, 
and business and mining leases were permitted to be as long as ten 
years.85 Accordingly, so long as the allottee could convince the 
federal government that he or she was somehow "unable" to work 
the land, the land could be leased.86 
Some commentators at the time were shocked and outraged by 
the expanded leasing privileges under the Act of 1894.87 To them, the 
goals of American Indian self-sufficiency and assimilation were seri-
ously undermined by leasing.88 In an attempt to appease some of these 
critics, Congress passed yet another piece of legislation, The General 
Indian Appropriations Act of 1897.89 This Act changed the leasing 
system largely back to the form first introduced in 1891, fixing the 
maximum term for mining or business leases at five years and changing 
farming and grazing leases back to a maximum of three years.90 In 
addition, the Act of 1897 specifically removed the word "inability" as 
used in the Act of 1894, such that "age or other disability" once again 
became the only legal grounds for permitting leases.91 
Even with the leasing limitations of the original Act of 1891 largely 
back in place, many legislators and commentators still viewed the 
allotment process as forever damaged. The whole idea behind the 
limitation in alienability as prescribed by the Dawes Act was, in effect, 
to compel the American Indian to cultivate his or her own land and 
become self-sufficient-free from the often unscrupulous tactics of 
84 OTIS, supra note 4, at 118 (quoting Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners, 1894, 
at421). 
85Id. 
86 See id. 
87Professor Charles C. Painter, national lobbyist for the Indian Rights Association, criticized 
the relaxed leasing provisions in the 1894 Act: 
We have reached a crisis. It is the intention of men in the West, and their efforts 
are being more and more felt in Congress as the power of the West is becoming 
greater in controlling national affairs,-it is the intention of these men to sweep 
away all these limitations and restrictions which the severalty [allotment] law put 
in the Indian's power to alienate his land. 
Id. at 119 (citation omitted). 
88 See id. 
89 General Indian Appropriations Act of 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 85 (1897). 
90Id. 
91 Id.; see also OTIS, supra note 4, at 120; PRICE, supra note 12, at 729. 
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land-hungry settlers and businesses.92 Critics viewed the leasing of 
allotted land, however limited in scope, as wholly antithetical to those 
ends.93 An agent for the Omaha and Winnebago tribes94 wrote in 1898: 
Leasing of allotted agricultural lands should never be permit-
ted. The Indians should be compelled to live upon their 
allotments and support themselves by cultivating the land. 
They can do it, but will not unless compelled to. Not one acre 
of allotted agricultural land should be leased to a white 
man ... until the Government has so far advanced the In-
dian, by compulsion if necessary, in the industries of his 
reservation that they are a self-supporting community .... 95 
In summary, although the federal government limited its early 
leasing policy only to those completely unable to cultivate their land 
(by reason of age or other disability), strong outside pressure-from 
well-meaning supporters of American Indian self-sufficiency, as well as 
from land-hungry business concerns-had pushed the government to 
expand these narrow exceptions.96 Congress, through its General In-
dian Appropriations Act of 1894, yielded to this outside pressure and, 
by some accounts, largely eviscerated the allotment policy.97 Through 
leasing, the American Indian "came more and more to look upon land 
as a source of revenue from the labor of someone else."98 Certainly, 
this was not the outcome envisioned by the framers of the Dawes Act. 
Put into its historical context, the introduction of leasing to the 
American Indian allottee effectively undermined the higher policy 
goal of allotment: American Indian self-sufficiency,99 By the 1890s, 
92 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. 
93 See generally OTIS, supra note 4, at 124-38. 
94 It was estimated in 1898 that of the 140,000 acres allotted to the Omaha and Winnebago 
tribes, 112,000 acres or roughly eighty percent had been leased. Id. at 130. 
95Id. at 130-31 (citation omitted). 
96 See id. at 141. 
97Id. at 130. 
98 OTIS, supra note 4, at 149. "One agent [of an Indian tribe] said that the Indians got more 
out of the leased land than if they worked them themselves." Id. at 125. Another historian noted: 
Clearly, leasing vitiated the whole purpose of the twenty-five year trust period, 
making a mockery of the notion that the Indians would utilize the opportunity to 
improve their farming skills in preparation for the day they received clear title to 
their lands and assumed the duties and privileges of citizenship. 
DIPPlE, supra note 5, at 179. 
99 Apparently, the significance of leasing in undermining the allotment policy was not fully 
recognized at the time. One historian comments: 
The decision to allow the Indian to lease his land was fraught with grave conse-
quences for the whole allotment system. Probably it was the most important decision 
as to Indian policy that was made after the passage of the Dawes Act. Yet, interestingly 
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Congress had begun "the process of breaking down the safeguard 
of inalienability which had been thrown around Indian allot-
ments .... "100 The government's policy of making the American In-
dian independent had taken an ironic twist: whereas before allotment 
the American Indians depended on each other through the tribe, the 
leasing "improvements" now made many of them increasingly depen-
dent on the rents and fees paid by predominately white lessees. lOl 
Perhaps one could argue that this latter dependence actually 
served as a positive step along the road to American Indian assimila-
tion. The veracity of this argument notwithstanding, American Indian 
dependence upon anyone but the self ran counter to the goals of 
allotment under the Dawes Act of 1887.102 The allotment system had 
seriously broken down, and needed either a major overhaul or, as many 
critics of the time argued, dismantling. l03 
D. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 
The federal government's policy of allotment came to an abrupt 
end in 1934 when Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, also referred to as the Wheeler-Howard Act or the Indian New 
Deal.104 For almost half a century, the government had engaged in an 
overt kind of "social engineering" regarding the American Indian. The 
underlying policy logic seemed virtually ironclad: (1) tribal strength 
and identity undermined individual American Indian assimilation and 
self-sufficiency; (2) the most visible and malleable source of tribal 
strength and identity was the commonly owned land;105 (3) individual 
allotments of that land would undermine tribal strength and identity; 
accordingly, (4) with the tribal strength and identity weakened, the 
enough, the significance of the leasing question seemed to be dwarfed in the eyes 
of contemporaries by the pressing matter of equal allotments. 
PRICE, supra note 12, at 553 (emphasis added). 
100 See OTIS, supra note 4, at 150-51. 
101 See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987) 
(noting "Indians, rather than farming the lands themselves, evolved into petty landlords, leasing 
their allotted lands to white ranchers and farmers and living off meager rentals."). 
102 See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text. 
103 See DIPPlE, supra note 5, at 309-10. 
104 See Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988); 
see also County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 686 (1992). For a more detailed 
discussion of this legislation, see COHEN, supra note 12, at 83-87; PRICE, supra note 12, at 572-82; 
Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REv. 
955,961-79 (1972). 
105 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. 
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individual American Indian would then be free to assimilate and be-
come a self-sufficient member of the larger, "civilized" society.106 
The linchpin of the government's policy logic, however, was the 
complete substitution of the American Indian's internal value system 
for that of the dominant culture. 107 Assimilation did not merely mean 
that the American Indian would elect to participate in the dominant 
culture: he or she must also wholly embrace it, ideally forsaking his or 
her own cultural values in the process. IOS 
Arguably, the allotment policy collapsed because this necessary 
substitution of values never really occurred. I09 For the majority of 
American Indians, the tribe was not something to be eschewed, but 
embracedYo The land was not a source of pecuniary power to be 
harnessed, but a source of spiritual nurture to be shared.lll Even 
though the American Indian participated in the external manifesta-
tions of the allotment process, i.e., obtaining individual tracts of land, 
the internal or policy motivations of the allotment process remained 
largely unrealized. 
In addition to the relative failure of American Indian cultural 
assimilation, opponents of the allotment policy pointed out that "[f]ar 
from making the Indians self-supporting citizens, the Dawes Act had 
made them 'virtual paupers' .... "112 Moreover, opponents pointed to 
catastrophic American Indian land loss as a direct result of the allot-
ment policy. Representative Edgar Howard, Chairman of the House 
Indian Mfairs Committee, commented in 1934: 
106 See generally OTIS, supra note 4, at 8-33. 
107 See id. at 10. 
lOB Rep. Edgar Howard, Chairman of the House Indian Mfairs Committee, commented in 
1934: 
[Our] formula for civilizing the Indians has always been the policy of intolerance 
and suppression combined with a forcible religious and educational proselytism 
designed to compel the Indian to give up his own beliefs and views of life, his 
languages and arts and customs, and accept those of the white man .... 
73 CONGo REc. 11,729 (1934). 
109 According to one historian, the most forceful proponents of the overthrow of allotment 
"assumed that inside every Indian, no matter how assimilated, there lurked a [tribal member] 
waiting to be freed, a communal being eager to shuck off the trappings of individualistic, 
materialistic white civilization in order to recapture a long-lost communal past" DIPPlE, supra 
note 5, at 312 (citations omitted). In reality, such a view was probably as narrow as that of the 
Dawes Act era assimilationists, only in reverse. Id. 
110 See generally GILL, supra note 2; CHAMPAGNE, supra note 2. 
m See GILL, supra note 2, at 10-11. 
112DIPPIE, supra note 5, at 314; see alw Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987) (discussing 
the problem of "fractionation" of allotted lands through descent and devise). 
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In 1887 our Indian wards numbered 243,000. They owned 
137,000,000 acres ofland, more than one-third good farming 
land and a considerable portion on valuable timberlands. 
Today they number about 200,000. Their land holding has 
shrunk to a mere 47,000,000 acres. Of this remnant only 
3,500,000 acres may be classed as farming lands, 8,000,000 
acres as timberlands of any value, 16,000,000 acres as good 
grazing lands, and 19,000,000 acres, almost one-half the In-
dian land remaining, as desert or semiarid lands of limited 
use or value. ll3 
Put simply, the allotment process was not working at all as envi-
sioned, and these statistics on land loss provided Congress with one 
of the strongest arguments for the policy's termination.1l4 
Mter numerous modifications and compromises concerning the 
language and scope of certain provisions,115 Congress passed the In-
dian Reorganization Act on June 15, 1934. Under this new Act, 
allotment in severalty was halted on all reservations, and the 
trust period was indefinitely extended for allottees who did 
not already have clear title, though those with holdings on 
the public domain were exempted from this and other pro-
visions. The Secretary of the Interior was given discretionary 
power to restore to tribal ownership remaining "surplus" 
lands on reservations previously opened, as well as to acquire 
additional territory to augment the Indian land base.l16 
11373 CoNG. REc. 11,726 (1934). 
114DIPPIE, supra note 5, at 315. Although a large portion of Indian land loss was the result 
of opening former reservation lands for settlement, another significant source of loss was the 
behavior ofthe allottees themselves. See generally 73 CONGo REG. 11,724-44 (hearings on American 
Indian self-government). In spite of the twenty-five year prohibition on alienation prescribed by 
the Dawes Act, many allottees would sell their lands upon the government's grant of the fee-pat-
ent See id. at 11,727. Rep. Howard commented: 
The [Dawes Act], so far from being a means of civilizing the Indians, soon became 
a perfect tool for the capture of Indian lands. As soon as the Indians had begun to 
receive their unrestricted patents, they flocked in great numbers to the real-estate 
agents and the land seekers and parted with their deeds for small sums of ready 
cash .... 
Id. Although such action was well within the rights of the allottee (or, for that matter, any property 
owner), it directly conflicted with the government's long-term goals of American Indian self-
sufficiency. Arguably, it is precisely this conflict which underlies the later indefinite extension of 
the governmental trust period for allotted lands. See infra part IV, sec. B (discussing conflict 
between federal trust provisions and American Indian self-determination). 
115 See generally DIPPlE, supra note 5, at 309-16; Comment, supra note 104 (each reviewing 
the complex procedural history of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934). 
116DIPPIE, supra note 5, at 316. 
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In addition to these provisions, the Act provided that tribes had the 
right to organize for the common welfare and "could adopt an 
'appropriate' constitution and bylaws which would become effective 
when ratified by a majority vote .... "117 
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 did not, however, win 
unanimous support. Critics of the Act likened it to a monumental step 
backwards for the policy of American Indian assimilation. One histo-
rian notes that those tribes most assimilated were likewise most upset 
by the changes in the allotment policy.us Opponents of the measure 
charged that it had a "segregationist bias" and was a "radical, commu-
nistic measure" designed to strip away individual American Indian 
property rights. 1l9 
These criticisms notwithstanding, Congress's passage of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 represented a revolutionary approach to 
American Indian affairs-at least with respect to the legislative meth-
odology employed in the Dawes Act of 1887. First, whereas under the 
Dawes Act tribal compliance with allotment often was made compul-
sory,120 the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 offered tribes a relatively 
democratic choice of whether to adopt its provisions. 121 Second, Con-
117 Id.; see also Comment, supra note 104, at 969-79. 
118Included in this category were the New York Senecas, the Five Civilized Tribes, and the 
Oklahoma Cherokee, many of which viewed the measure as precipitating a "prejudice which will 
imperil our social and economic status." DIPPlE, supra note 5, at 312. 
119 See id. 
120 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. Rep. Howard observed in 1934: 
It is no longer necessary to indulge in theoretical arguments for or against the 
allotment idea. The cold fact of what has happened to the Indians and their land 
under that [Dawes] Act conclusively proves that allotment was a costly tragedy both 
to the Indians and to the Government. The Indians themselves were not consulted 
in the passage of this Act, and once it was enacted they feared and opposed it. 
Allotment was literally forced upon them against their wishes both in the adoption 
of the Act and in its subsequent application to the various reservations. 
73 CONGo REc. 11,727 (1934). 
121 '''This Act,' the critical clause read, 'shall not apply to any reservation wherein a majority 
of the adult Indians, voting at a special election duly called by the secretary of the interior, shall 
vote against its application." DIPPlE, supra note 5, at 317 (quoting The Statutes at Large (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1934), XLVIII, pt. 1,984-88, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 478 (1988)). Thus, for the first 
time in the history of federal Indian affairs, the American Indians themselves would be able to 
accept or reject a government policy initiative by use of referendum. Id. 
In recent years, however, there seems to have been a retreat from the relatively democratic 
ideals espoused in 1934. As of May 24, 1990, the provision extending indefinitely the trust period 
for allotted lands was made mandatory for: (1) all Indian tribes; (2) all lands held in trust by the 
United States for Indians; and (3) all lands owned by Indians that are subject to a restriction 
imposed by the United States on alienation of the rights of the Indians in the lands. Pub. L. 
101-31, § 3(a), 104 Stat. 207 (1990), codified at 25 U.S.C. § 478-1 (1990 Supp.). 
The legislative history for 25 U.S.C. § 478-1 points to the government's need for adminis-
trative efficiency in dealing with American Indian lands: 
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gress's passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 represented 
significant progress toward reestablishing a policy of "cultural relativ-
ism" regarding American Indian affairs. No longer would the federal 
government consider the "white way" as the only way for the American 
Indian, as implicitly was the case under the Dawes Act: "[t]he choice 
must be given Indians, individually and as a group, whether to preserve 
tribal relations within the relatively secluded reservation setting or to 
merge with society at large."122 
Thus, a central theme123 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 
provided that the American Indian retain a choice in whether he or she 
wished to assimilate or enjoy a "functioning [tribal] self-govern-
ment."124 John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs commented in 
1934: 
Perhaps the most drastic innovation of the last two years has 
been our effort not only to encourage the Indians to think 
[25 U.S.C. § 478-1] provides that trust and restricted Indian lands which have not 
been subject to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 ... shall be subject to the 
same indefinite extension of the trust or restriction period for Indian lands pro-
vided in [25 U.S.C. § 462] .... Currently the trust and excepted provisions affected 
by the amendment are extended by order of the Secretary of the Interior every five 
years as a ministerial function .... Such separate treatment is not appropriate and 
is administratively burdensome. 
S. REP. No. 226, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 196, 19B. 
122 DIPPlE, supra note 5, at 321. This choice did not come without its costs, however. For 
example, under the Act, a $10 million revolving loan fund was established to "promote the 
economic development of the chartered [tribal] corporations and their individual members." Id. 
at 317. Because only incorporated tribes could take advantage of this fund, there was great 
pressure upon all American Indian groups to accept the provisions of the Act or else risk further 
impoverishment See id. at 317. 
123 The main purpose of the Act was not remedial in nature, but simply to put a halt to the 
practice of allotting Indian lands in severalty: 
Except by authorizing reacquisition of allotted lands in trust, however, Congress 
made no attempt to undo the dramatic effects of the allotment years on the 
ownership of former Indian lands. It neither imposed restraints on the ability of 
Indian allottees to alienate or encumber their fee-patented land [those held for the 
relevant trust period], nor impaired the rights of those non-Indians who had 
acquired title to over two-thirds of the Indian lands allotted under the Dawes Act. 
County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 68!h'!7 (1992); see also 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 461, 462 (1988). This phenomenon is probably explained best by recognizing that there were 
formidable proponents of assimilation who lobbied hard for limits on the sweeping reforms of 
the Indian Reorganization Act See supra notes 3~2 and accompanying text. The present form 
of the Act is most certainly a compromise between the assimilationists' and the self-determinists' 
camps. See DIPPlE, supra note 5, at 309-15 for a discussion of the Act's multiple revisions. 
124DIPPIE, supra note 5, at 312. Anotherlegal scholar notes: "Of the 252 tribes that voted on 
whether to adopt the IRA [Indian Reorganization Act], 174 tribes accepted, but only 92 voted to 
accept an IRA constitutional government and only 71 adopted economic development corpora-
tions under its provisions." CHAMPAGNE, supra note 2, at 128; see also supra note 122. 
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about their own problems but even to induce them to 
Our design is to plow up the Indian soul, to make the Indian 
again the master of his own mind. If this fails, everything fails; 
if it succeeds, we believe the Indian will do the rest. 125 
75 
American Indian self-determination, then, became the federal gov-
ernment's policy regarding the modern American Indian. 126 
IV. LIMITATIONS ON AMERICAN INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION-
THE INDEFINITE LAND TRUST 
The federal government's policy of promoting self-determination 
for the American Indian in general has been tempered somewhat as 
applied to the American Indian allottee in particular. 127 Although the 
government has long since abandoned the policy of individual allot-
ment, current vestiges of that policy's impact remain.128 Under the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, lands that previously had been 
allotted but not yet fee-patented would continue to be held in trust 
indefinitely.129 In actuality, this is a much more drastic prohibition on 
alienability than any prescribed by the now "infamous" Dawes Act, 
which only required a twenty-five year trust period, after which the land 
would be held by the allottee in fee simple absolute. 13o In turn, certain 
lands that had been allotted under the Dawes Act of 1887 may continue 
125DIPPIE, supra note 5, at 321 (citation omitted). 
126 President Richard M. Nixon announced a new era of American Indian self-determination 
in the early 1970s. See O'Brien, supra note 7, at 44. The President's action allegedly was taken in 
response to a resurgence of assimilationist strength in the 1950s and 1960s which created the 
federal government's "termination" policy: ''This policy involved the unilateral termination of the 
United States' relationship with the tribes, with the ultimate goals of assimilating all Indian people 
by breaking down cultural and tribal bonds." Id.; see also CHAMPAGNE, supra note 2, at 128. The 
termination policy was discarded in the 1970s, heralding the idea that "[t]he time [had] come 
to break decisively with the past and to create the conditions for a new era in which the Indian 
future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions." O'Brien, supra note 7, at 44 (quoting 
Message From the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian Policy, 
H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)); see also Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified, as amended, at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, 455-458e 
(1988)); PRICE, supra note 12, at 778-80; CHAMPAGNE, supra note 2, at 6. 
127 See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text. 
128E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1988). 
129 Id.; see also United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 541 (1980). Note, however, that 
extension of this trust period was conditioned on the acceptance of the Act's provisions by a 
majority of the adult American Indians residing on the particular reservation in question who 
were eligible to vote. See 25 U.S.C. § 478 (1988). Arguably, the American Indian allottee had some 
semblance of a choice in accepting this restriction. The recent changes in this provision, however, 
do not seem to provide the same sense of democratic determination of American Indian land 
use as did the original Act. See 25 U.S.C. § 478-1 (1990 Supp.); see also supra note 121. 
130 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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to be held in trust and thus subject to alienation and encumbrance 
restrictions. 131 
A. The Story of "Sue" (Revisited): A Variation on the Allotment Theme 
On February 3, 1993,Judge Richard H. Battey of the United States 
District Court for the District of South Dakota ruled that Sue's bones 
had been illegally excavated by the Black Hills Institute and should be 
returned to the government. 132 The court based its ruling on the fact 
that Mr. Williams's land is trust land, "held by the United States in trust 
status. "133 By the terms of the trust-patent held by Mr. Williams and the 
laws and regulations of the United States, an alienation by sale of an 
interest in the landl34 must be made with the express consent of the 
Secretary of the Interior. 135 Although the Black Hills Institute paid Mr. 
Williams $5000 for the right to excavate the fossil, no prior consent to 
this agreement was obtained from the Secretary of the In terior.136 The 
court held that without this consent, Mr. Williams's attempted sale of 
Sue to the Black Hills Institute was absolutely null and void.137 
On its face, the relationship between Mr. Williams's land and 
allotted lands may seem tenuous at best. For example, Mr. Williams 
apparently is not an allottee for purposes of the indefinite trust period 
131 See Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir.) (concluding under 25 U.S.C. § 462, 
the Secretary of the Interior may continue trust status of restricted lands indefinitely), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 965 (1978). Moreover, such restrictions on alienation do not terminate with the death 
of the original allottee, but run with the land. See, e.g., Bowling v. United States, 233 U.S. 528, 
535 (1914); United States v. Taunah, 583 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (W.D. Okla. 1983), set aside and 
remanded on other gTIJunds, 730 F.2d 1360 (10th Cir. 1984); Couch v. Udall, 404 F.2d 97, 99 (10th 
Cir. 1968). 
132 See Black Hills Inst. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 812 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (D.S.D. 1993). 
133 See id.; see also Deroy Murdock, Bum Rap for a Dinosaur Named Sue?, WASH. TIMES, June 
12,1993, at C1 (discussing prosecution's argument that because Mr. Williams voluntarily accepted 
the tax-free advantages of his trust-patent, it is equitable that he also abide by the alienation 
restrictions of the patent). This argument would have greater force but for the possible implica-
tion of 25 U.S.C. § 478-1, which could significantly change Williams's "expectation interest" 
arising from his original trust-patent agreement with the federal government. See supra notes 121, 
129 and accompanying text. 
134 Sue's bones were ruled to be an interest in the land and not personal property as was 
argued by the Black Hills Institute. See Black Hills Inst., 812 F. Supp. at 1021. 
135 Id.; see also supra note 21. 
136 See Black Hills Inst., 812 F. Supp. at 1022. 
137 See Black Hills Inst. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 812 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (D.S.D. 1993); 
see also 25 C.F.R. § 152.22 (1992) ("(a) Individual lands. Trust or restricted lands, except inherited 
lands of the Five Civilized Tribes, or any interest therein, may not be conveyed without the 
approval of the Secretary. Moreover, inducing an Indian to execute an instrument purporting to 
convey any trust land or interest therein, or the offering of any such instrument for record, is 
prohibited and criminal penalties may be incurred. (See 25 U.S.C. 202 and 348.)"). 
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prescribed by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934;138 technically, he 
holds a trust-patent deed to his land granted by the federal govern-
ment in 1969, which is set to issue in fee simple absolute in 1994.139 
There are, however, at least two points of significant intersection 
between Mr. Williams's trust-patent land and lands allotted under the 
Dawes Act of 1887, which, because of the Indian Reorganization Act 
of 1934, continue to be held in trust indefinitely. First, because Mr. 
Williams's land is held in trust, it is subject to all existing governmental 
laws and regulations regarding alienation of American Indian trust 
lands in general,l40 Under the district court's analysis, for example, 
there is virtually no legal distinction between the restrictions against 
alienation imposed on Mr. Williams's trust-patent land and those im-
posed on American Indian allotted lands held in trust. 141 
Second, although Mr. Williams's trust-patent is scheduled to ripen 
into full fee simple absolute in 1994, recent federal legislation regard-
ing American Indian lands could conceivably impede this process. 142 
For example, 25 U.S.c. § 478-1 expressly makes the indefinite trust 
period created by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 for lands 
allotted under the Dawes Act applicable to, inter alia, "all lands held in 
trust !Jy the United States for Indians."143 Although the legal analysis is 
not conclusive, it would seem that regardless of the terms of Mr. 
Williams's trust-patent deed-terms which were made expressly subject 
to all statutory provisions and restrictions144-the language in 25 U.S.C. 
§ 478-1 would not allow Mr. Williams's land to become fee-patented 
in 1994 absent the express consent of the Secretary of the Interior. 145 
Therefore, as a result of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 
and more recent legislation which draws upon that Act's indefinite 
trust provision for certain American Indian allottees, even a "non-al-
lottee" such as Maurice Williams is anything but free to determine what 
he wishes to do with his land. This phenomenon certainly begs the 
general question with respect to certain American Indian property 
138 Although the practice of allotment of American Indian lands ceased under the Indian 
Reorganization Act, federal law continued to provide that trust-patents could be issued. The most 
likely reason for this policy is the creation of a tax-free status for land held by the patent holder. 
See Black Hills Inst., 812 F. Supp. at 1020; see also 25 U.S.c. § 348 (1988); supra note 133. 
139 See Black Hills Inst., 812 F. Supp. at 1017. 
140 See id. at 1019-21; see also supra note 10. 
141 See Black Hills Inst., 812 F. Supp. at 1019-21. 
142 See supra note 121. 
143 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 462, 478-1 (1988 and 1990 Supp.) (emphasis added); see also supra note 
121. 
144 See Black Hills Inst. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 812 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (D.S.D. 1993). 
145 See 25 U.S.C. § 483 (1988); see also supra note 121. 
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rights: whatever happened to the federal government's heralded policy 
of promoting American Indian self-determination?146 
B. The Continuing Legacy of Allotments Past: A Critical Commentary 
The federal government's policy of American Indian self-determi-
nation, as espoused by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, may be 
somewhat of a misnomer-at least with respect to the property rights 
of certain American Indian landholders. Under the Dawes Act of 1887, 
the government held allotted land in trust for a period of no more 
than twenty-five years.147 Upon the expiration of this trust period, the 
government released to the allottee an unrestricted fee-patent to the 
land, to do with what he or she wished. l48 
Apparently, to the chagrin of many legislators and American In-
dian rights advocates, rather than work it as envisioned, the allottee 
often wished to sell the land as quickly as possible.149 This behavior 
severely undermined the government's long-term goals of American 
Indian assimilation and agrarian self-sufficiency.15o As a result, the In-
dian Reorganization Act of 1934 not only eliminated further individual 
allotments, but also indefinitely extended the period of trust for exist-
ing lands that were already allotted but not yet released in fee.l51 
In reviewing the rather extensive legislative history of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, one would be hard put to discover any 
evidence of nefarious in ten t on the part of Congress against the Ameri-
can Indian in creating the indefinite trust provision.152 To the contrary, 
the genuine aim of the provision appears to be one of "protecting" the 
American Indian from the catastrophic land loss that occurred under 
the allotment pOlicy.153 In a way, the reasons for implementing the 
indefinite trust provision of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 
seem to mirror the reasons cited for imposing the twenty-five year trust 
period under the Dawes Act of 1887. Put simply, Congress opined that 
American Indians needed protection-not only from land-hungry set-
tlers, but from themselves.154 
146 See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text 
147 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
146 See supra note 54 and accompanying text 
149 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text 
150 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text 
151 See supra note 116 and accompanying text 
152 See generally Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Cmnm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. (1934); Hearings on S. 2755 Before the Senate Cmnm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1934); 73 CONGo REc. 11,724-44, 12,001-04 (1934) (Comm. Rep. on S. 3645). 
153 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text 
154 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text 
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To the modern observer, however, it is rather curious that few 
legislators at the time realized that the government's ongoing "benevo-
lent guardian" role was largely antithetical to a policy of true American 
Indian self-determination.I55 Certainly, this is not to say that the Ameri-
can Indian allottees would not need any governmental assistance or 
guidance in the utilization of their newly granted individual parcels. I56 
Rather, the threshold question is: at what point does this necessary 
governmental assistance become, in a sense, dictatorial in nature, 
thereby significantly undermining the primary goal of American In-
dian self-determination? 
There is no simple answer to this exceedingly complex dilemma. 
Implicitly, self-determination requires not only that one have the 0p-
portunity to make one's own decisions, but indeed the ability to do so 
as well. When, as a result of selling off their lands upon the expiration 
of the trust period, numerous American Indian allottees became gov-
ernment-dependent paupers,I57 their independent decisionmaking 
ability probably was rendered nonexistent. In our competitive, market-
driven economy, where one's "purchase power" is often held in highest 
esteem, abject poverty would not appear to be a socially or politically 
empowering condition. 
Viewed in this light, Congress's imposition of the indefinite trust 
provision in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 is not without 
merit.I5S By keeping and maintaining their lands, the American Indian 
allottees conceivably would retain something of significant value; some-
thing that could facilitate at least their economic assimilation. I59 Be-
155 Many critics of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, however, were quick to point out 
this policy inconsistency. See generally 73 CONGo REC. 11,733-42 (1934) (Comm'n Rep. on 
S.3645). 
156This is particularly so where, as under the Dawes Act, many tribes were forced to partici-
pate in the allotment policy. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. It would hardly seem 
equitable to compel a people to adopt a heretofore unknown policy with no subsequent guidance. 
157 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
158This argument applies with equal force to the modern adaptation of the indefinite trust 
provision. See 25 U.S.C. § 478-1 (1990 Supp.) (applying the indefinite trust period created under 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 to all American Indian lands presently held in trust); see 
also supra note 12l. 
159Rep. Howard, commenting on the merits of the Indian Reorganization Act, noted: 
This program will pave the way for a real assimilation of the Indians into the 
American community on the level of economic independence and political respect. 
The so-called "assimilation" of the past has been largely the Federal abandonment 
of pauperized and landless Indians to make their own way, as best they might, in 
the white community. The Indians are now segregated far more through poverty 
and inferiority feeling than through any possible geographic segregation. The 
program of self-support and ... experience in the management of their own af-
fairs ... will permit increasing numbers of Indians to enter the white world on a 
footing of equal competition. 
73 CONGo REc. 11,732 (1934). 
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yond these financial factors, however, the esteem and confidence 
which must surely be experienced by the self-sufficient allottees cannot 
be discounted. 1OO 
Notwithstanding these important considerations, Congress's in-
definite trust provision of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 
sweeps too broadly.161 Even if one was to concede that the mere twenty-
five year trust period for allotted lands under the Dawes Act perhaps 
did not adequately protect the welfare of the American Indian allottee, 
certainly a kind of universal, "perpetual" trust goes too far. Under such 
a perpetual trust system, any policy of promoting significant American 
Indian self-determination seems largely devoid of substance. As men-
tioned above, some limitations on the alienability of trust land along 
with initial government support and guidance for the allottee are no 
doubt necessary to provide the best chance for the allottee's self-
sufficiency.162 Beyond this, however, any "permanent" restrictions on 
alienation will inevitably erode the government's parallel goal of pro-
moting American Indian self-determination. 
Ultimately, any viable policy of promoting complete self-determi-
nation for American Indian allottees (and, for that matter, anyone 
else) must incorporate the possibility of some unwise and uninformed 
decisions being made by them. True self-determination embraces the 
chance of success equally with the chance of failure; the exercise of 
free will carries with it no implied or express guarantees. The federal 
government, in its well-intentioned but overreaching attempt to "pro-
tect" the American Indian allottee, arguably has prevented much of 
this self-determination from occurring.163 
Thus, future self-determination for American Indian allottees will 
be enhanced by the degree to which the federal government's role as 
the allottees' benevolent guardian is diminished. Only when the Amer-
ican Indian allottee is truly free to make significant decisions regarding 
his or her own land, i.e., without first having to obtain the "permission" 
of the federal government, will any kind of significant self-determina-
tion be possible.I64 At present, there is little indication that this free-
dom for the American Indian allottee is forthcoming. 165 
160 See id. 
161 See supra notes 116, 121 and accompanying text. 
162 See supra note 156. 
163 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. 
164 As one historian prophetically observed: "The trust responsibility of the United States, to 
the extent that it involves obligations of a binding nature, may limit the power of the federal 
government to permit complete [American Indian] self-determination as to the trust res." PRICE, 
supra note 12, at 728. 
165 See supra note 121; see also CHAMPAGNE, supra note 2, at 6. 
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v. CONCLUSION 
Although long since abandoned, the hundred-year-old govern-
ment policy of allotting individual American Indians tracts of land may 
continue to affect certain modern American Indian landowners. In 
fact, more recent legislation designed to assuage the deleterious effects 
of allotment is, in some respects, more restrictive on alienation and 
encumbrance of allotted lands than were the original allotment laws. 
Although not wholly devoid of merit, one consequence of such 
"protectionist" legislation is that many informed and capable American 
Indian landholders are unnecessarily restricted in making business or 
personal agreements that may concern their lands. Where our modern 
government's primary stated policy goal for the American Indian is 
self-determination, the current status of certain individual American 
Indian property rights makes for a politically inconsistent-and, argu-
ably, socially damaging-result. 

